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LOCAL RIGHT-TO-WORK ORDINANCES: WHY § 14(B) OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT PREEMPTS POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS FROM REGULATING UNION-SECURITY
AGREEMENTS
Michael Soder

I. INTRODUCTION
“Right-to-work laws” are a bit of a misnomer. Rather than referring to
laws that seek to expand the number of individuals eligible to work in a
state, right-to-work laws refer to union-security legislation that prohibit
employers and unions from agreeing that workers have to join, or not join,
a union as a condition of employment.1 The ability of states to pass such
laws originated in Congress’ adoption of the National Labor Relations
Act (“NLRA”) of 1935, which was amended in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley
Act.2 This 1947 amendment added § 14(b) to the NLRA, which is the
foundation for states’ authority to enact right-to-work laws.3
As of April 2019, twenty-seven states have enacted right-to-work
laws.4 Passage of these laws occurred in the context of major policy
debates founded on ideas of “liberty, freedom and a state’s economic
development.”5 Proponents of right-to-work laws argue that they protect
the rights of individual workers to choose whether to support labor
unions, and that companies are more likely to do business in right-to-work
states.6 Labor groups, on the other hand, argue that right-to-work laws are
merely an effort to undermine labor unions as employees can refuse to
pay dues but still enjoy all the benefits derived from union negotiations
with employers.7
Despite right-to-work laws having existed for more than half a century
pursuant to § 14(b), the exact scope of § 14(b) is still unclear. This is
because § 14(b) expressly allows “States” to pass right-to-work laws but
1. 48 AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 527 (2019).
2. James C. Thomas, Right-To-Work: Settled Law or Unfinished Journey, 8 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
163, 163-65 (2007).
3. Id. Although § 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act has been codified as 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), this
section will continue to be referred to as § 14(b) throughout this Article.
4. See Right To Work Is …, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE, https://nrtwc.org/facts/rightwork-mean/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2019). These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
5. Thomas, supra note 2 at 165.
6. Connor Beatty, Right To Work: Right for Maine?, 20 NO. 10 ME. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (2015),
Westlaw 20 No. 10 SMMEEMPLL 3.
7. Id.

911

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

1

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 12

912

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

is silent regarding whether political subdivisions of a state, such as cities,
municipalities, counties, or townships, have the authority to pass similar
laws. The issue has recently gained increasing attention as Kentucky,
Illinois, and New Mexico localities have all passed local right-to-work
ordinances.8 New Mexico is the recent frontrunner in the debate with ten
different counties having adopted such local ordinances.9 The New
Mexico Senate, however, recently passed a bill that could ban these local
ordinances.10
Prior to June 10, 2019, a circuit split existed between the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits regarding the proper interpretation of the term “States”
in § 14(b).11 In 2016, the Sixth Circuit held that the word “State” includes
political subdivisions of a state, and therefore § 14(b) exempts local rightto-work ordinances from NLRA preemption.12 In 2018, the Seventh
Circuit disagreed, holding that § 14(b)’s exception to preemption only
confers authority to states to pass right-to-work laws.13 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in International Union of Operating Engineers
Local 399 v. Village of Lincolnshire and was poised to address this
difficult issue of statutory interpretation. In the meantime, however,
Illinois enacted the Collective Bargaining Freedom Act that bans a local
government or political subdivision from creating or enforcing an
ordinance that prohibits, restricts, or regulates union security agreements,
nullifying Lincolnshire’s lawsuit.14 Thus, the Supreme Court summarily
dismissed the case as moot and resolved the circuit split.15
Although the Seventh Circuit’s opinion has been vacated and the
8. See Brenna Goth, Local Right-to-Work Rules Sweep New Mexico Counties, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 20, 2018, 6:40 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/local-right-to-work-rulessweep-new-mexico-counties.
9. See Nicholas Chan, New Mexico Senate Passes Bill to Ban Local ‘Right-to-Work’ Ordinances,
JURIST LEGAL NEWS & RESEARCH SERVS., https://www.jurist.org/news/2019/03/new-mexico-senatepasses-bill-to-ban-local-right-to-work-ordinances/ [https://perma.cc/3L4A-SDFK].
10. Id.
11. See United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 3047 v. Hardin Cty.,
Kentucky (United Auto.), 842 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2016); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill.
of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of
Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019).
12. United Auto., 842 F.3d at 420.
13. See Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995 (7th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019).
14. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 12/20; see After Illinois Ban on Local “Right-To-Work” Laws,
Supreme Court Boots Union Busters, INT’L UNION OF OPERATING ENG’RS LOCAL 150 (June 2019),
http://local150.org/after-illinois-ban-on-local-right-to-work-laws-supreme-court-boots-union-busters/
[https://perma.cc/GK5L-8XYD]. As this recent legislation demonstrates, states are free to expressly
prohibit political subdivisions from passing right-to-work ordinances. Therefore, the issue of interpreting
§ 14(b) exists only if the state has not done so.
15. Village of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692
(2019).
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circuit split resolved, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the
case. Therefore, the underlying substantive issue of interpretation of §
14(b) remains. Thus, this Article will analyze the differing statutory
interpretation approaches utilized by both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
to determine the proper approach. This Article argues that the Seventh
Circuit arrived at the correct result, albeit its’ analysis was flawed in
failing to specifically address the issue within the Supreme Court’s
preemption jurisprudence which requires “clear and manifest indication
that Congress sought to supplant local authority.”16 Given the specific
statutory framework of the NLRA, along with the NLRA’s overarching
purpose and spirit, § 14(b) must be construed narrowly to only encompass
states. Section II introduces the NLRA and potentially applicable
Supreme Court precedent regarding statutory interpretation in the field of
preemption. Section III demonstrates that, taken as whole, based on the
statutory language of the NLRA, the NLRA’s legislative history and
overall purpose, and Supreme Court precedent regarding statutory
interpretation in the context of preemption, § 14(b) should be construed
as excluding political subdivisions of a state.
II. BACKGROUND
Both United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers of America Local 3047 v. Hardin County, Kentucky and
International Union of Operating Engineers Local 399 v. Village of
Lincolnshire concern whether the NLRA permits political subdivisions of
the state to regulate union-security agreements. In order to dissect this
issue, Section II(A) will first discuss the history of the NLRA, and then
the general law surrounding NLRA preemption specifically regarding §
14(b). Next, Section II(B) briefly examines potentially applicable
Supreme Court precedent regarding other statutory schemes. Finally,
Section II(C) outlines the reasoning employed in both United Automobile
and Village of Lincolnshire.
A. The NLRA and Union Security Agreements
In 1935, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”),17 a broad federal law that established federal labor relations
16. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 434 (2002) (citing
Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611 (1991)).
17. Act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169). The NLRA
was first introduced in 1934 by Senator Wagner as the “Wagner Act,” and sought to “clarify and fortify”
the National Industrial Recovery Act. See Joan E. Baker, NLRA Section 8(a)(3) and the Search for a
National Labor Policy, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 71, 76 (1989); see also National Labor Relations Board,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1935, at 15 (1949),
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standards regulating the relationships between private-sector employees
and labor unions.18 The NLRA provides that employees “shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection[.]”19 By inscribing these
rights in law, Congress sought to “eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce” by addressing the
inequality of bargaining power between employers and employees while
simultaneously upholding the freedom of association and liberty of
contract.20 Through protecting the rights of both employees and
employers, the NLRA seeks to promote the general welfare of workers,
businesses, and the United States economy as a whole.21
A main focus of the NLRA is regulation of union security agreements.
A union security agreement is a negotiated “agreement between a union
and an employer that the employer will require all employees to undertake
some specified level of union support as a condition of employment.”22
Union security agreements generally consist of three varieties: closedshop agreements, union-shop agreements, and agency-shop agreements.
A union-shop agreement provides that “no one will be employed who
does not join the union within a short time after being hired.”23 An
agency-shop agreement generally provides “that while employees do not
have to join the union, they are required usually after 30 days to pay the
union a sum equal to the union initiation fees and are obligated as well to
make periodic payments to the union equal to the union dues.”24 If an
employer has a closed-shop agreement “the employer may hire only union
members and must require all employees to maintain their union
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015014754413;view=1up;seq=201.
18. See United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hardin Cty., 160 F. Supp.
3d 1004, 1006-07 (W.D. Ky. 2016), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part sub nom, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 3047 v. Hardin Cty., Kentucky, 842 F.3d 407 (6th
Cir. 2016). The NLRA was subsequently amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, the
“Taft-Hartley Act.” See Int’l Union of Operating Engineers Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d
995, 999 (7th Cir. 2018).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 151. In introducing the NLRA, Senator Wagner expressed his belief that
“[g]enuine collective bargaining is the only way to attain equality of bargaining power” in light of modern
industrialism,” particularly given the then perceived “sham of equal bargaining power” resulting from
employer-dominated unions. NLRB, supra note 17 at 15; see also Baker, supra note 17 at 76-77.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
22. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor Relations
Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51, 57 (1990)
(citing R. Gorman, Labor Law 639 (1976)).
23. Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 409,
n.1 (1976).
24. Id.
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membership and pay union dues.”25
Union security agreements are governed by § 158(a)(3) (“8(a)(3)”) of
the NLRA.26 As originally enacted, § 8(a)(3) permitted closed-shop
agreements, union-shop agreements, and agency-shop agreements.27
Nevertheless, in 1947 Congress amended the NLRA through the TaftHartley Act28 and banned closed-shop agreements due to widespread
abuse.29 Both union-shop and agency-shop agreements, however, are still
permitted. § 8(a)(3), in pertinent part, provides
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of
the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement
with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment
membership therein on or after the thirteenth day following the beginning
of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is
later[.]30

In essence, § 8(a)(3) provides that no federal statute shall preclude
union-security agreements, as certain agreements are valid as a matter of
federal law.31 However, notwithstanding § 8(a)(3), the NLRA continues
to reflect congressional concern with compulsory unionism,32 as
demonstrated in the following section’s examination of § 14(b).
B. The Doctrine of Preemption Applied to the NLRA
The doctrine of preemption states that in cases where federal law
conflicts with state law, federal law is supreme and preempts the state

25.
26.
27.
28.

Dau-Schmidt, supra note 22 at 57 (citing R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW 639, 641-42 (1976)).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. at 414.
The Taft-Hartley Act was codified as the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-

197.
29. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. at 414 (internal citations omitted).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). (declaring that it is not an unfair labor practice for a union and employer
to require membership in a union as a condition of employment, provided specified conditions in the
NLRA are met. See Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 9899 (1963)).
31. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. at 416.
32. Id. at 415.
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law.33 Generally speaking, there are three forms of preemption.34 Under
“express” preemption Congress can explicitly define, through a
preemption provision included in the legislation, the extent to which the
enactment preempts state law.35 “Conflict” preemption occurs where,
even in the absence of an express preemption provision, there is an
implicit conflict between federal and state law.36 The last variation,
“field” preemption, is an implicit preemption37 that occurs when Congress
has regulated a “field” of activity “so comprehensively that … [Congress]
has left no room for supplementary state legislation.”38 In this last
situation, Congress has determined that the field in question must be
regulated by Congress’ exclusive governance.39
The NLRA does not contain any express preemption provision.40 And
given that the NLRA regulates an area of traditional state concern, an
NLRA preemption analysis starts with the basic proposition that

33. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S.Ct. 1461, 1479
(2015). The doctrine finds its basis in the Supremacy Clause, which is itself not a source of any federal
rights but rather creates a “rule of decision.” Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324
(2015); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493
U.S. 103 (1989); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600 (1979); Gade v.
National Solid Waste Management Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (“[U]nder the Supremacy clause, from
which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged
power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield[.]”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
34. See 81A C.J.S. States §49 (Jan. 2019); see also Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,
604-05 (1991) (“The ways in which federal law may pre-empt state law are well established and in the
first instance turn on congressional intent.”). Despite the variations, all forms essentially work in the same
manner: “Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors; a state law
confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with the federal law; and therefore the federal law takes
precedence and the state law is preempted.” Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1480.
35. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983)). Express preemption is fundamentally a question of congressional intent and
statutory construction, as the phrasing of preemption provisions is often obscure. See Murphy, 138 S.Ct.
at 1480.
36. State law will be impliedly preempted where it is “impossible for a private party to comply
with both state and federal requirements.” Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 480 (2013) (internal
citation omitted); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (holding that state law is
preempted where it “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress”).
37. Substantively, field preemption, unlike express of conflict preemption, does not involve
congressional commands to states; rather, Congress intends to foreclose state regulation in the area. See
Murphy, 138 S.Ct. at 1480; see also Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373, 377 (2015) (“Congress has
forbidden the State to take action in the field that the federal statute pre-empts.”) (emphasis in original).
38. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986) (internal citation
omitted); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012) (noting that congressional intent
can also be inferred where there is a “federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”) (citing Rice v. Santana Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
39. Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399.
40. 2003 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (originally published in 2003).
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“Congress did not intend to displace state labor law.”41 The Supreme
Court has, however, articulated two preemption doctrines, under the
umbrella of field preemption, distinct to the NLRA to determine whether
state regulations or causes of action are preempted.42 The Garmon
preemption doctrine prohibits states from regulating activity that the
NLRA prohibits or protects, or arguably prohibits or protects.43 Thus, the
Supreme Court has confirmed that § 8(a)(3), via field preemption and
Garmon, preempts state laws purporting to regulate any activities that fall
within the ambit of the NLRA.44 In contrast, the Machinist preemption
doctrine concerns whether Congress intended for conduct not covered by
the NLRA to nonetheless be preempted.45 The doctrine answers this
question by proscribing state or municipal regulation of areas that have
been left “to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.”46
Under Garmon preemption, any state law purporting to regulate the
activities covered by § 8(a)(3) could be deemed implicitly preempted. The
Supreme Court relied on Garmon preemption when it ruled that unionsecurity agreements, being a matter as to which “federal concern is
pervasive and its regulation complex,” is an activity that falls within the
scope of § 8(a)(3) and is thus implicitly preempted.47
41. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders & Contractors of
Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 224 (1993) (internal citation omitted); see 188 A.L.R.
Fed. 543 (originally published in 2003).
42. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 748-49 (1985).
43. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 244 (1959); Metro, 471 U.S. at 748; Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S.
282, 286 (1986); 108 A.L.R. 5th 253 (originally published in 2003). Initially, the doctrine was limited
only to what the NLRA prohibited or protected, but the doctrine was subsequently expanded to cover what
the NLRA “arguably” prohibits or protects. See, e.g., Gould, 475 U.S. at 286.
44. See Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995, 1000
(7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int;l Union of
Operating Eng’rs Local 399, 138 S. Ct. 2692 (2019) (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s
Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959). In Garmon, the Court began with the proposition
that “where the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility
that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived
the States of the power to act.” 359 U.S. at 244. Although labor legislation regarding union activity falls
within the area of traditional state concerns, the Court found that leaving the states “free to regulate
conduct so plainly within the central aim of . . . [the NLRA] involves too great a danger of conflict between
the power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law.” Id. Doing so “would create
potential frustration of national purposes.” Id.
45. See Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wis. Emp’t
Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976); see also 188 A.L.R. Fed. 543 (originally published in
2003).
46. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 507 U.S. at 225 (quoting Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140). This
doctrine preserves Congress’ intentional balance “between the uncontrolled power of management and
labor to further their respective interests.” Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S.
608, 614 (1986) (internal citation omitted).
47. Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Emp. Of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 296 (1971).
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Although § 8(a)(3) provides that certain union security agreements are
valid as a matter of federal law, shall not be precluded, and are preempted
by federal law, Congress recognized that states may wish to exempt
themselves from this policy.48 As originally enacted, the NLRA, and more
specifically § 8(a)(3), created confusion among scholars and the courts as
to whether Congress preempted this field.49 Therefore, in 1947 the TaftHartley Act added § 14(b) to the NLRA, which states:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution
or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization
as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law[.]50

As the Supreme Court has noted, this language “was designed to make
clear that . . . [§8(a)(3)] left the States free to pursue their own more
restrictive policies in the matter of union-security agreements.”51 Thus,
although state laws banning union-security agreements conflict with §
8(a)(3), such regulations can be saved if they fall within the purview of
§14(b).52 As a result of § 14(b), states are permitted to pass right-to-work
laws, which are regulations prohibiting collective bargaining agreements
between employers and trade unions from including union-security
agreements that require union membership as a condition of
employment.53
Despite this language, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits reached contrary
48. Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 41617 (1976). This is particularly so given that union activity has traditionally been a local matter.
49. See Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. at 100-02; see
also 174 A.L.R. 1051 (originally published in 1948) (analyzing the extent to which the enactment of the
NLRA precludes states from enacting labor relations legislation).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b).
51. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. at 417 (citing Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103
(1963)); see also N.L.R.B. v. Houston Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc., 349 F.2d 449,
453 (5th Cir. 1965) (“the terms of § 14(b) as well as the legislative history suggests the intent on the part
of Congress to save to the states the right to prohibit compulsory unionism,” but “contemplates only those
forms of union security which are the practical equivalent of compulsory unionism.”). Legislative history
reveals that the original Senate Committee was of the view that the NLRA as originally enacted already
allowed for such state regulation, and therefore the addition of § 14(b) was to clarify this position.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. at 101, n.9 (“[m]any states have enacted laws or adopted constitutional provisions
to make all forms of compulsory unionism in those States illegal. It was never the intention of the . . .
[NLRA] to preempt the field in this regard so as to deprive the States of their powers to prevent
compulsory unionism.” (citing H.R. Rep. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 60)).
52. “While . . . [§] 8(a)(3) articulates a national policy that certain union-security agreements are
valid as a matter of federal law . . . [§] 14(b) allows a State or Territory to ban agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. We have recognized that with respect
to those state laws which . . . [§] 14(b) permits to be exempted from . . .[§] 8(a)(3)’s national policy there
is . . . conflict between state and federal law; but it is a conflict sanctioned by Congress with directions to
give the right of way to state laws[.]” Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. at 416-17 (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
53. Fed. Lab. Law: NLRB Prac. § 15:3.
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decisions as to whether “State or Territory” contained in § 14(b) covers
political subdivisions of the state, such as municipalities, counties, or
cities.
C. Statutory Construction Generally and Regarding Preemption of
Political Subdivisions of States
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether § 14(b) encompasses
political subdivisions of states. The Court has, however, addressed this
issue in the context of other statutory schemes. In Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier the Court decided whether the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”)54 preempted local
governmental regulations of pesticide use.55 Although FIFRA specifies
several roles for both state and local authorities, the provision at issue, §
136v(a), permitted a “State” to regulate the sale or use of pesticide.56 In
concluding that FIFRA does not preempt local government regulations,
the Court relied on two intertwined lines of reasoning57 to conclude that
FIFRA “fails to provide any clear and manifest indication that Congress
sought to supplant local authority.”58 First, the Court concluded that
FIFRA’s textual language and legislative history were ambiguous: FIFRA
does not expressly define “State” as including political subdivisions, other
provisions allow delegation to local officials for enforcement, and the
Members of Congress disagreed on the issue.59 Second, in analyzing the
relationship among states and their political subdivisions, the Court first
noted that “the constitutionality of local ordinances is analyzed in the
same way as that of statewide laws,”60 as political subdivisions are merely
“subordinate components” of the state.61 Focusing on the issue of
delegation, the Court reasoned that reading § 136v(a) as excluding
political subdivisions would have the “anomalous result” of preempting
delegation from the state to local authorities provided by other FIFRA

54. 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.
55. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597 (1991).
56. “A State may regulate the sale or use of any federally registered pesticide or devise in the
State[.]” 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a). FIFRA does not expressly supersede local regulation of pesticide use.
Mortier, 501 U.S. at 606.
57. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 616.
58. Id. at 611.
59. Id. at 606-10.
60. Id. at 605 (citing Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985)).
61. Id. at 612.
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provisions.62 Thus, “State” in § 136v(a) included political subdivisions.63
Similarly, in City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, the
Supreme Court considered whether a provision of the Interstate
Commerce Act (“ICA”) that specifically saved the “States” power to
regulate the safety of vehicles also extended to political subdivisions of
the state.64 Other provisions of the ICA explicitly included both “State”
and political subdivisions, and had this not been the case, the Court stated
that Mortier would have been dispositive.65 Citing Mortier for the
proposition that “clear and manifest indication” was required to conclude
that Congress intended to supplant local authority, the majority concluded
that such indication was lacking;66 therefore, local regulation was also
saved from preemption.67
D. Circuit Split: United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural
Implement Workers of America Local 3047 v. Hardin County,
Kentucky and International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 399,
AFL-CIO v. Village of Lincolnshire68
As noted above, union-security agreements occupy an interesting
62. Id. at 608. For example, 7 U.S.C. § 136u(a)(1) allows the Administrator to delegate to any state
the authority to cooperate in the enforcement of FIFRA. If the term “State” impliedly excluded political
subdivisions, the Court found it “unclear why the one provision would allow the designation of local
officials for enforcement purposes while the other would prohibit local enforcement authority altogether.”
Id. at 608-09
63. “[T]he more plausible reading of FIFRA’s authorization to the States leaves the allocation of
regulatory authority to the ‘absolute discretion’ of the States themselves, including the option of leaving
local regulation of pesticides in the hands of local authorities.” Mortier, 541 U.S. at 608.
64. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 428 (2002). The
general preemption provision of the ICA explicitly preempts regulation by both “a State” and by a
“political subdivision of a State,” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), and almost every other provision in the statute
references both states and political subdivisions. Id. at (a), (b)(1), (c)(3)(B), (c)(3)(C). However, the
specific provision at issue was a carve out from the general preemption, and only explicitly references “a
State[.]” Id. at (c)(2)(A).
65. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 432.
66. The Court’s reasoning was based on several considerations, one being that safety regulations
of motor vehicles is a traditional state police power. Id. at 439-440. Additionally, the legislative history
revealed Congress’ focus was on “state economic regulation,” whereas the provision in question dealt
with “state safety regulation.” Id. at 440-41. Thus, the Court clarified that the provision only saved local
“safety regulatory authority” from preemption. Id. at 442.
67. Id. The Court specifically held that “[a]bsent a clear statement to the contrary, Congress’
reference to the ‘regulatory authority of a State’ should be read to preserve, not preempt, the traditional
prerogative of the States to delegate their authority to their constituent parts.” Id. at 429.
68. Although this Article is limited to the discussion of whether § 14(b) preempts political
subdivisions from enacting right-to-work ordinances, it is worth noting that several scholars have
questioned courts interpretation of § 14(b) as to the power of states to regulate union-security agreements.
See, e.g., Ian M. Seruelo, Note, Harmonizing Section 14(b) With the Policy Goals of the NLRA on the
Heels of Michigan’s Enactment of Right-to-Work Laws, 36 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 427 (2014); Benjamin
Sachs and Catherine Fisk, Restoring Equity in Right to Work, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 857 (2014); Thomas,
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position within the NLRA—§ 8(a)(3) prohibits federal law from
precluding certain union-security agreements, and per Garmon
preemption, state regulation of union-security agreements are implicitly
preempted. Yet § 14(b) provides a specific carve-out, trumping Garmon
preemption and permitting “State[s] or Territor[ies]” to pass regulations
pertaining to union-security agreements.69 Most every court that has
addressed whether local right to work ordinances are preempted by the
NLRA has concluded in the affirmative.70
Prior to June 2019, a circuit split existed between the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits as to whether “State or Territory” in § 14(b) encompasses
political subdivisions of the state. Specifically, the dispute centered
around whether §14 (b) permits states to delegate71 power to their
subdivisions to regulate union-security agreements.72 In 2016, the Sixth
Circuit in United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement
Workers of America Local 3047 v. Hardin County, Kentucky concluded
that a county’s right-to-work ordinance73 is considered “State law” under
§ 14(b) and thus is not preempted.74 The court first disagreed with the
District Court’s statutory construction of the term “State” in § 14(b),
concluding that interpreting this term as including the laws of political
subdivisions “absolutely is a logical reading.”75
supra note 2; David G. Summers, Plumbers and Pipefitters: The Need to Reinterpret the Scope of
Compulsory Unionism, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 493 (1984).
69. See supra Section II(A)-(B).
70. See Ariana R. Levinson, et. al., Federal Preemption of Local Right-to-Work Ordinances, 54
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 457, 476-80 (2017); see also New Mexico Fed’n of Labor, United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 1564 v. City of Clovis, N.M., 735 F. Supp. 999, 1003-04 (D.N.M. 1990)
(concluding that local right-to-work enactments do not constitute “state” law within the meaning of §
14(b)); Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Puckett, 391 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Ky. 1965).
71. As noted above, the more proper description would be whether states can redelegate this
authority to political subdivisions since § 14(b) grants authority back to states to regulate union-security
agreements.
72. See United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 3047 v. Hardin Cty.,
Kentucky, 842 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Int’l Union of Operating Engineers Local 399 v. Vill.
of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of
Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019).
73. Hardin Fiscal Court passed a county ordinance, Ordinance 300, in January 2015, providing
that no person covered by the NLRA “shall be required as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment: to become or remain a member or a labor organization; to pay any dues, fees, assessments,
or other charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization[.]” United Auto., 842 F.3d at 410.
74. Id. at 420. The District Court had previously ruled that “State law does not include county or
municipal law for purposes of § 14(b)[.]” United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
v. Hardin Cty., 160 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1010 (W.D. Ky. 2016), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part sub
nom, Hardin County, 842 F.3d 407. Relying on “standard principle[s] of statutory construction” the
District Court concluded that the two uses of “State” in § 14 (b) “refer[] to the same thing,” i.e. the term
only encompasses state law. Id. at 1008-10.
75. United Auto., 842 F.3d at 413 (emphasis in original). Based on this interpretation,
§ 14(b) would read as “[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
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The court then moved on to consider conflicting lines of cases. Mortier,
the court reasoned, strongly supports including political subdivisions in §
14(b)’s exception to preemption.76 From a more general perspective,
Mortier establishes that express authorization to “States” does not infer
exclusion of political subdivisions, as these subdivisions are merely
components of the state.77 In more closely analyzing Mortier, the court
concluded that although the Supreme Court was examining a different
regulatory scheme, there was no discernable material distinction between
“the operative principles in the Mortier analysis and the instant case.”78
The court then extensively analyzed Ours Garage, which “represent[ed]
even stronger authority” for the inclusion of political subdivisions in §
14(b) since the NLRA is completely silent as to political subdivisions.79
Overall, the court concluded that the NLRA provided neither a persuasive
basis to distinguish Mortier or Ours Garage nor the “clear and manifest
purpose” required to supplant local authority.80
The Seventh Circuit addressed this same issue in International Union
of Operating Engineers Local 399 v. Village of Lincolnshire in September
2018, holding that “the authority conferred by . . . [§] 14(b) does not
extend to political subdivisions,” and thus the Village’s right-to-work
ordinance was preempted.81 Crucial to this decision was the proposition
employment in any State [or political subdivision thereof] or Territory in which such execution
or application is prohibited by State [or political subdivision’s] or Territorial laws.” The lower
court focused specifically on the second reference to “State” in § 14(b), but the Court noted
that interpreting the first reference to “State” even further supported this conclusion: “the
county’s position is even stronger when we turn the formulation around. That is, if the first
reference to ‘State’ . . . includes political subdivisions of the State (which is plainly must, as
political subdivisions are components of the State, within the State, that exercise governmental
power of the State, that exercise governmental power of the State), then the second reference
to state must also be read to include political subdivisions, thereby necessarily excepting the
law of political subdivisions from preemption as well.” Id. at 413.
76. Id. at 414.
77. Id. at 414 (citing Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607-08 (1991)).
78. Id.
79. “Per Ours Garage, this silence is to be construed as preserving state authority to delegate its
governmental powers to its political subdivisions as it sees fit.” Id. at 415 (referencing Ours Garage, 536
U.S. at 429).
80. Id. at 417. The Court also cited several cases that stood for contrary propositions, including
Sixth Circuit precedent, but concluded these cases carried no persuasive weight given that they predated
Ours Garage and/or Motier. Id. at 416-17 (citing CSX Transportation v. City of Plymouth, 86 F.3d 626
(6th Cir. 1996); Petrey v. City of Toledo, 246 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2001); Kentucky State AFL-CIO v.
Puckett, 391 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1965); New Mexico Fed’n of Labor v. City of Clovis, 735 F. Supp. 999
(D.N.M. 1990)).
81. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995, 999 (7th Cir.
2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019). Section 4 of the ordinance banned union-security agreements
by prohibiting “any requirement that workers join a union, compensate a union financially, or make
payments to third parties in lieu of such contributions.” Id. The District Court had previously reached the
same conclusion. See Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 399, AFL-CIO v. Vill. of Lincolnshire,
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that interpreting § 14(b) as permitting delegation to political subdivisions
of the state would do “violence to the broad structure of labor law[.]”82
First, the court noted that the Supreme Court has carefully monitored the
state’s authority under § 14(b), as any state regulation executed under §14
(b) undermines Congress’ purported goal in passing the NLRA.83 The
court then focused on how delegation stands in stark contrast to the
NLRA’s goal of creating national uniformity in labor law and minimizing
industrial strife.84 As such, the court did not address the issue within the
“clear and manifest” framework presented by Mortier and Ours Garage
since “[t]he federal labor laws … are a different matter altogether.”85
Interpreting § 14(b) as permitting states to redelegate the power the
section cedes back to them makes little sense, the court reasoned, as such
an interpretation would create “a crazy-quilt of regulations” that would
place employers in “impossible positions.”86 Moreover, redelegation
would create a frenzy of administrative nightmares.87
Based on the foregoing proposition, the court distinguished both
Mortier and Ours Garage based upon the differing statutory schemes.88
Whereas Mortier found clues in FIFRA’s regulatory language indicating
that exclusion of political subdivisions would have created inherent
tensions in FIFRA, no such clues are present in the NLRA.89 Likewise,
Ours Garage concerned an express preemption provision of the ICA,

Illinois, 228 F. Supp. 3d 824, 837-38 (N.D. Ill. 2017), aff’d sub nom, Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995.
82. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1005.
83. Id. at 1001 (“[the NLRA” favors permitting [union-security] agreements unless a State or
Territory with a sufficient interest in the relationship expresses a contrary policy via right-to-work laws.”)
(citing Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. at 420)).
84. Id. at 1005-06 (citing NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41, 45 (1937)).
85. Id. at 1007.
86. Id. at 1004-05. The concern for employers stems from Mobil Oil, where the Supreme Court
held that an employee’s “predominant job situs” is the triggering factor for § 14(b). 426 U.S. 407, 414
(1976). As the Court stated, “right-to-work laws cannot void agreements permitted by . . . § 8(a)(3) when
the situs at which all the employees covered by the agreement perform most of their work is located
outside of a State having such laws.” Id. Therefore, if § 14(b) extends to political subdivisions, the
employer’s duty to bargain or prohibition on bargaining could shift from day to day or job to job. Vill. of
Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1004. For example, imagine an employer in State X which had no state-wide
right-to-work law, but Village Y had enacted a valid and enforceable right-to-work law. Further, imagine
that nearby Village Z did not have a right-to-work ordinance. If the employer had offices in Village Y,
but its workers’ predominant job situs was in Village Z, the employer would risk committing an unfair
labor practice by refusing to bargain over an agency-shop provision. See Id.
87. There are more than 90,000 general and special-purpose governments in the United States
compared to just 50 states. Id. As workers of many trades or industries often operate in several
municipalities, even in the same week, employees and employers could potentially be subject to extensive
conflicting collective bargaining regulations if § 14(b) included political subdivisions of states. Id.
88. Id. at 1006-08.
89. Id. at 1006 (citing Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 608-09 (1991)).
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while redelegation in the context of § 14(b) does not.90 Furthermore, the
court emphasized that union regulations, although once falling under
states’ police power, have been under the control of the federal
government for nearly a century.91
III. ARGUMENT
This Section argues that the Seventh Circuit is correct that “State” as
employed in § 14(b) of the NLRA does not include political subdivisions
of the state, and therefore political subdivisions of the state are preempted
from passing local right-to-work ordinances prohibiting union-security
agreements. The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning was somewhat flawed,
however, in that it did not analyze § 14(b) under Mortier’s and Ours
Garage’s requirement of “clear and manifest” congressional intent to
supplant local authority.92 Yet as the proceeding analysis demonstrates,
even analyzing § 14(b) under the principles announced in Mortier and
Ours Garage, § 14(b) should be narrowly construed to exclude political
subdivisions.
Section III(A) will first briefly analyze the statutory language of the
NLRA to conclude that from a purely textual analysis, the statute’s
language insufficiently provides the requisite congressional intent to
preempt local right-to-work ordinances. Section III(B) sheds light on
why, given the legislative history and purpose of the NLRA, a purely
textual analysis is not dispositive, and thus the Seventh Circuit correctly
dispensed with an in-depth textual analysis. Lastly, Section III(C)
analyzes Mortier and Ours Garage to reveal that these opinions are not
as dispositive of the issue as articulated by the Sixth Circuit. Overall, the
analysis demonstrates that the NLRA is a unique, complex statutory
framework that, when understood as a whole, necessitates a strict and
narrow reading of § 14(b) to abide by congressional intent and preserve
the spirit and purpose of the NLRA.

90. “Section 14(b) plays a different function. It is not the source of NLRA preemption; rather, it
is an exception to the general preemption established by the Act for the field of labor relations. The
question is only how much subnational authority does section 14(b) restore.” Id. at 1008.
91. Id.
92. In order to avoid this requirement, the Court reasoned that Mortier and Ours Garage involved
the scope of an express preemption provision, whereas § 14(b) is an exception to the general preemption
of the NLRA. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1008. While such a distinction is important, it is the
author’s opinion that this difference is more properly considered as evidence of a “clear and manifest”
indication that Congress sought to exclude political subdivisions from § 14(b), as opposed to a distinction
warranting departure from Mortier’s and Ours Garage’s teachings.
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A. A Purely Textual Analysis of the NLRA Supports the Sixth Circuit’s
Conclusion but is Inadequate
With an issue of statutory construction, the starting point is always the
statutory language. Some scholars have argued that the language of the
NLRA only allows states to pass right-to-work laws.93 This Section,
however, argues that when focusing solely on the statutory language,
“State” as used in § 14(b) does except political subdivisions from the
NLRA’s general preemption. Under this rationale, the Sixth Circuit
reached the proper conclusion based solely on the text of the NLRA.
Nevertheless as the proceeding Sections III(B) and III(C) will explain, the
Seventh Circuit was correct in holding that due to the unique nature of the
NLRA, political subdivisions are not included in § 14(b)’s exception from
preemption.
As some scholars, as well as the Seventh Circuit, have noted,
construing the term “State” in § 14(b) to encompass political subdivisions
creates some issue when analyzing the rest of the statute, as there are
instances in which other statutory provisions clearly differentiate between
state and local power.94 First and most compelling, § 14(a) of the TaftHartley Act states that supervisors are not required to be defined “as
employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local[.]”95 As this
provision is included in the same section as § 14(b), it is telling that
Congress uses the word “local” instead of the word “State.” “Local” in
this provision is understood as referring to both state and local law, and
thus reading “State” in § 14(b) to encompass local law would render
“local” in § 14(a) meaningless.96 Differentiating between state and local
law in these two adjacent provisions provides one piece of evidence that
Congress did not intend for “State” in § 14(b) to encompass political
subdivisions.
The NLRA’s definitional section, § 152(2), further supports the
Seventh Circuit’s construction of § 14(b). The NLRA defines an employer

93. For a thoughtful, more in-depth textual analysis, albeit a differing outcome, see Levinson, et
al., supra note 70 at 480-85.
94. See Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995, 1003-04
(7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs Local 299, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019); see also Levinson, et al., supra note 70 at 480-85;
United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Hardin Cty., 160 F. Supp. 3d 1004,
1006-07 (W.D. Ky. 2016), aff’d in part as modified, rev’d in part sub nom. United Auto., Aerospace &
Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 3047 v. Hardin Cty., 842 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Day
v. James Marine, Inc., 518 F.3d 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2008) (“If words are known by the surrounding
company they keep, they are surely known by how they are used in the surrounding sections of the same
statute.”).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 164(a).
96. Levinson, et al., supra note 70 at 481.
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as excluding “any State or political subdivision thereof[.]”97 If “State” in
§ 14(b) encompasses political subdivisions, then the inclusion of this
phrase in § 152(2) would be rendered superfluous.98 When § 14(b) is
compared to this section of the NLRA, the more natural reading of “State”
is to limit § 14(b)’s exception from preemption to state law only. This
serves as further evidence that the general reference to “State” does not
include political subdivisions.
Likewise, pertinent language in § 158 is illuminating. This section
allows a party to a collective bargain contract to terminate or modify such
contract if said party notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service and simultaneously notifies “any State or Territorial agency”
established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the “State or
Territory” where the dispute occurred.99 If this reference to “State or
Territory” is read to include political subdivisions, then such notification
requirements become much more complex.100 A party would be required
to also notify any local mediation agency, which seems to be a peculiar
result considering the party already has to notify Federal and state
agencies.101
Finally, § 160(a) empowers the National Labor Relations Board to cede
agency jurisdiction regarding certain industries to “any agency of any
State or Territory[.]”102 As the NLRA created a framework of federal
regulations regarding labor law that was historically reserved to the states,
this provision naturally makes sense if “State” only includes states.
Allowing the NLRB to cede agency jurisdiction to a local agency,
however, would seem to be an unusual outcome given that the NLRA
seeks to create uniformity in labor law.
Notwithstanding the preceding analysis, and similar conclusions drawn
by other scholars,103 based solely on the NLRA’s language, the Sixth
Circuit correctly concluded that § 14(b)’s use of the term “State”
encompasses political subdivisions.104 As the Supreme Court has noted,
“[t]he exclusion of political subdivisions cannot be inferred from the
express authorization to the ‘State[s]’ because political subdivisions are

97. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
98. Levinson, et al., supra note 70 at 481-82.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(3).
100. See Levinson, et al., supra note 70 at 482-83.
101. Id. at 482-83.
102. 29 U.S.C. §160(a).
103. See Levinson, et al., supra note 70 at 480-85.
104. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 3047 v. Hardin Cty., 842
F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2016). This maxim states that “identical words and phrases within the same statute
should normally be given the same meaning.” Id. (citing Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc.,
551 U.S. 224, 232 (2007)).
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components of the very entity the statute empowers.”105 Political
subdivisions are merely “convenient agencies” for states to exercise the
use of their governmental powers through delegation.106 Thus, construing
the term “State” narrowly to exclude political subdivisions requires a
“clear and manifest purpose” to preempt local authority,107 a purpose that
is lacking from the text of the NLRA.
NLRA § 14(b) contains no reference to “political subdivisions” and
therefore, standing alone, the term “State” does include political
subdivisions.108 And even considering the scattered differentiations
between state and local power found elsewhere in the statute, such
language is insufficient to establish the necessary congressional intent to
preempt local authority.109 The Sixth Circuit correctly noted that the
“presumption-of-consistent-usage” maxim supports the result that §
14(b)’s use of “State” encompasses political subdivisions.110 The NLRA’s
language, standing alone, does not provide the necessary congressional
intent to limit the construction of the term “State.” Therefore, the term
“State” in § 14(b) can plausibly be read to contemplate redelegation of
the state’s authority to regulate union-security agreements to its political
subdivisions.
However, interpreting a statute might also require examining the
statute’s legislative history to determine congressional intent.111 As the
following Sections demonstrate, the Seventh Circuit correctly decided not
to place controlling weight on the NLRA’s statutory language in
construing § 14(b).
B. The Legislative History and Purpose of the NLRA
As explained in the prior Section, a purely textual analysis of the
NLRA in light of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding delegation
between states and their political subdivisions supports the Sixth Circuit’s
position. However, the Seventh Circuit correctly chose not to rely solely
on the literal terms of the NLRA and instead focused more on the statute’s
105. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 608 (1991).
106. Id. at 607-08.
107. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 432 (2002).
108. See Id. (“Had 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) contained no reference at all to ‘political subdivision[s] of
a State,’ the preemption provision’s exception for exercises of the ‘safety regulatory authority of a State,’
§14501(c)(2)(A), undoubtedly would have embraced both state and local regulation.”).
109. See Mortier, 501 U.S. at 612 (“The scattered mention of political subdivisions elsewhere in
FIFRA does not require their exclusion [in 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a).]”).
110. United Auto., 842 F.3d at 413.
111. See, e.g., United Auto., 842 F.3d 407; Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of
Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of
Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019). This is not always
the case, but courts often do so whenever the language itself is ambiguous.
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legislative history and overall purpose.112 The following analysis reveals
that the NLRA indeed occupies a unique position that, when joined with
the preceding analysis, warrants construing § 14(b) strictly and narrowly
such that local right-to-work ordinances are preempted.113
First and foremost, the Sixth Circuit failed to place sufficient weight
on the NLRA’s overall purpose of “creating a national, uniform body of
labor law and policy[.]”114 Given the pervasive regulatory framework of
the NLRA, the Supreme Court has noted that if not for § 14(b), the NLRA
would have a full preemptive effect.115 Recognizing the overall spirit and
purpose of the NLRA, the Seventh Circuit correctly claims that construing
§ 14(b) to permit delegation to political subdivisions of the state would
“do violence to the broad structure of labor law[.]”116 Although allowing
states to enact or prohibit right-to-work laws undoubtedly undermines
Congress’ goal in achieving national uniformity in labor law, exempting
states from preemption is a rational decision given historical state control
over labor relations and the basic tenants of the United States’ federal
system of government. And although the Supreme Court has stated in
dicta that specific exceptions that run contrary to a particular
congressional goal do not invariably call for the narrowest possible
construction,117 such a narrow construction is warranted in this
instance.118
Construing § 14(b) to permit delegation to political subdivisions of the
state would create an “administrative nightmare” that would not merely
tend against the spirit of the NLRA, but essentially eradicate it.119 In a
state that has yet to enact laws regulating union-security agreements, the
hundreds of cities, villages, and municipalities within the state could enact
varying union-security agreement regulations that would hinder
112. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1004.
113. See Id.; see also Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Puckett, 391 S.W.2d 360, 362 (KY 1965); Retail
Clerks Intl. Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1963).
114. United Auto., 842 F.3d at 412; see Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1005-06.
115. See Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. at 102; see also Puckett, 391 S.W.2d at 362.
116. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995, 1005 (7th
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019).
117. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440 (2002); but see
Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1006 (“While section 14(b) represents a decision that some variation at
the state and territorial level is acceptable, that does not mean that national uniformity itself has been
abandoned as a goal.”).
118. As the Kentucky Supreme Court stated, “We think it is not reasonable to believe that Congress
would have intended to waive other than to major policy-making units such as states and territories, the
determination of policy in such a controversial areas as that of union-security agreements.” Puckett, 391
S.W.2d at 362. It is worth noting that the Supreme Court subsequently favorably cited the aforementioned
case, although not for this specific proposition. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 413, n.7 (1976).
119. See Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1004-05.
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employers, employees, and unions.120 Thus, the NLRA’s goal of creating
uniformity in labor law and reducing industrial strife121 would effectively
be extinguished if localities were able to regulate union-security
agreements.122 A state could theoretically have a web of conflicting
regulations surrounding union-security agreements, creating intra-state
tension among employers, employees, and labor unions. Given this
potential reality and the controversial nature of union-security
agreements, it is unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended for
§14(b) to exempt political subdivisions from preemption.123
While not specifically mentioned in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, the
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 provides strong support
for narrowly construing the term “State” in § 14(b). By the time the TaftHartley Act was passed into law—and § 14(b) was added to the NLRA—
twelve states had provisions in effect that outlawed or restricted closedshop or similar agreements.124 Congress was seemingly well aware of
these laws in the 1947 debates regarding the Taft-Hartley Act,125 and
added § 14(b) to “make clear and unambiguous the purpose of Congress”
not to preempt the field of union-security agreements as to state control.126
Additionally, local right-to-work ordinances did not exist at the time the
Taft-Hartley Act was before Congress.127 Given this context of the TaftHartley Act, it can properly be inferred that in passing § 14(b) Congress
specifically intended to exempt only state regulations.128
Additionally, Congress was clear that in enacting § 14(b), the purpose
was to “continue the policy of the Wagner Act and avoid federal
interference with state laws[.]”129 In the House Conference Report,
Senator Taft stated that § 8(a)(3), as originally enacted, “did not in any
way prohibit the enforcement of State laws which already prohibited
closed-shops.”130 Therefore, § 14(b) simply made clear that states are able
120. See Id.
121. See Id. at 1005-06 (citing NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971); NLRB Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 201 U.S. 1, 41, 45 (1937)).
122. See supra section II.D.
123. See Puckett, 391 S.W.2d at 362.
124. See Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 100, n.4
(1963) (citing State Laws Regulating Union-Security Contracts, 21 L.L.R.M. 66 (1948)).
125. Id. at n.5 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 34 (1947); S. REP. NO. 105, at 6 (1947)).
126. Id. at 100-01, n.8 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 245, at 44 (1947)).
127. A few scholars have noted that local right-to-work ordinances were not in existence at the time
the Taft-Hartley Act was passed. See Levinson, et al., supra note 70 at 485, n.157. These same scholars
note that state right-to-work ordinances did exist at the time. Id. at 485.
128. This inference is further supported by a Supreme Court decision in 1945 that raised genuine
concern as to whether state regulation of union-security agreements were preempted by § 8(a)(3). See Hill
v. State of Fla. ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); see also Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. at 100-01.
129. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. at 101-02.
130. Id. at 102 (citing Cong. Rec. 6520, 2 Leg. Hist. of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
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to regulate union-security agreements. Although the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that this particular piece of legislative history could mean the
use of “State or Territory” has “no particular significance,”131 the better
construction is to read the use of “State” as deliberate. Even interpreting
this legislative history as a special exception of Congress’ general
intention to preempt the field entirely,132 there is still a strong argument
for construing the term “State” narrowly given Congress’ awareness of
the then existing state right-to-work laws.133
As the Supreme Court has stated, Congress enacted the NLRA to create
national uniformity in labor law and to minimize industrial strife.134
Construing § 14(b) as permitting redelegation to political subdivisions
would directly oppose the objectives of the NLRA in any state that has
not enacted a right-to-work law.135 While the NLRA does favor
permitting union security agreements, Congress recognized that “a State
or Territory with a sufficient interest in the relationship” could “expresses
a contrary policy via right-to-work laws.”136 Yet it makes little sense to
believe that with these intended goals, Congress meant for § 14(b) to save
to the states the ability to confer authority on political subdivisions to
enact right-to-work laws.
C. The Seventh Circuit Correctly Distinguished Mortier and Ours
Garage
Despite the foregoing analysis, the crux of the split between the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits largely turns on what effect, if any, Mortier and
Ours Garage should have regarding the interpretation of § 14(b). The
Sixth Circuit concluded that both Supreme Court decisions are analogous
as they rejected “the very kinds of arguments” raised by the petitionerlabor organizations.137 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit distinguished the
decisions based upon the differing statutory frameworks at issue.138 As
1597).
131. Kentucky State AFL-CIO v. Puckett, 391 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Ky. 1965).
132. Id.
133. See Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. at 100, n.5 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p.
34; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p.6).
134. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995, 1005-06 (7th
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019) (citing NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971);
NLRB Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937)).
135. See Id.
136. Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 420
(1976).
137. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 3047 v. Hardin Cty., 842
F.3d 407, 414, 420 (6th Cir. 2016).
138. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1006-07.
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previously mentioned in this Article, given the NLRA’s broad preemptive
effect and pervasiveness, Mortier and Ours Garage neither require nor
suggest that § 14(b) should be construed broadly to encompass political
subdivisions within the term, “State.” Adhering to the principle that “the
meaning of words in a statute depend upon the character and aim of the
specific provision involved,” the Seventh Circuit properly distinguished
the Supreme Court decisions based on the differing statutory
frameworks.139 The following two Sections demonstrate that Mortier and
Ours Garage do not provide support for construing “State” in §14(b) as
including political subdivisions of the state.
1. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier
In analyzing Mortier, the Sixth Circuit did not find “any material
distinction” between Mortier’s operative principles and analysis of §
14(b).140 While conceding that Mortier concerned a different regulatory
scheme and did not make a “broad pronouncement” regarding the
interpretation of “State” in federal legislation, the Sixth Circuit
nonetheless found Mortier as strong support for its’ holding. While the
Sixth Circuit correctly noted several common factual features between
FIFRA141 and the NLRA,142 such similarities were greatly overstated.
As demonstrated above in Section III(B), the NLRA’s legislative
history provides strong support for construing the term “State,” as used in
§ 14(b), strictly and narrowly. On the other hand, FIFRA’s legislative
history provides no indication as to whether “State” as used in § 136v(a)
encompassed political subdivisions.143 Writing for the majority, Justice
White noted that the two Committees responsible for the FIFRA
amendment at issue disagreed over whether FIFRA preempted pesticide
regulation by political subdivisions.144 Given this disagreement, it would
be illogical to conclude that Congress had the intent, let alone a clear and
manifest purpose, to preempt local pesticide use. Despite any specific
mention of counties or political subdivisions in the NLRA’s legislative

139. Id. at 1006 (citing District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973) (internal quotations
omitted)).
140. United Auto., 842 F.3d at 414.
141. FIFRA was originally enacted in 1947 to regulate the use of pesticides. The specific
amendment in FIFRA addressed by the Court in Mortier was passed in 1972, as Congress responded to
growing environmental and safety concerns. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 601
(1991).
142. United Auto., 842 F.3d at 414.
143. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 609-10.
144. Id. at 610. Justice White found it important to note “this disagreement was confined to the preemptive effect of FIFRA’s authorization of regulatory power to the States in § 136v,” the particular
provision at issue. Id.
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history,145 this sharply contrasts with the NLRA’s legislative history.
The Seventh Circuit also correctly recognized that Mortier began with
a fundamentally different, albeit technical, baseline for construing
FIFRA. The issue in Mortier was whether § 136v(a) forbade political
subdivisions from regulating pesticide use, not whether political
subdivisions were authorized to regulate some matter otherwise beyond
their control.146 Construing the term “State” in § 14(b) is an entirely
different matter. The Supreme Court has recognized that the NLRA has a
broad preemptive effect, as, due to the interplay between § 8(a)(3) and §
14(b), state laws regulating union-security agreements are saved from
preemption only if the regulations fall within the purview of § 14(b).147
As § 14(b) is an exception to general preemption, in contrast to § 136v(a),
§ 14(b) should be construed narrowly.
FIFRA’s statutory framework also provides significant reason for
distinguishing Mortier. As the Sixth Circuit notes, FIFRA is a
“comprehensive regulatory statute.”148 Yet FIFRA is comprehensive in a
manner distinct from the NLRA, as FIFRA “implies a regulatory
partnership between federal, state, and local governments.”149 This is
because other FIFRA provisions explicitly designate local involvement as
part of the enforcement scheme.150 Therefore, construing “State” as used
in § 136v(a) as excluding political subdivisions would “require the
anomalous result” of preempting the actions of any local agency that

145. Levinson, et al., supra note 70 at 489.
146. See Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995, 1006-07
(7th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019) (emphasis in original); see also Mortier, 501 U.S. at
614 (“The specific grant of authority in § 136v(a) consequently does not serve to hand back to the States
powers that the statute had impliedly usurped. Rather, it acts to ensure that the States could continue to
regulate use and sale even where, such as with regard to the banning of mislabeled products, a narrow
pre-emptive overlap might occur.”).
147. Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 41617 (1976).
148. United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 3047 v. Hardin Cty., 842
F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 601 (1991). However,
the degree of FIFRA’s comprehensiveness is questionable. See Mortier, 501 U.S. at 615 (“FIFRA does
not suggest a goal of regulatory coordination that sweeps either as exclusively or as broadly as Mortier
contends.”).
149. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 615 (emphasis in original).
150. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136t(b) (“The Administrator shall cooperate with Department of
Agriculture, any other Federal agency, and any appropriate agency of any State or any political
subdivision thereof, in carrying out the provisions of this subchapter, and in securing uniformity of
regulations.”) (emphasis added); 7 U.S.C. § 136f(b) (requires manufacturers to produce records for
inspection “upon request of any officer or employee of the . . . [EPA] or of any State or political
subdivision) (emphasis added); 7 U.S.C. § 136u(a)(1) (authorizing the Administrator to “delegate to any
State . . . the authority to cooperate in the enforcement of . . . [this Act] through the use of its personnel
or facilities)” (emphasis added).
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exercised expressly authorized state-delegated powers.151 In contrast, the
NLRA contains no provisions implying a similar scheme; regulations of
union activity has resided with the Federal government for nearly a
century vis-à-vis the NLRA.152 And as previously noted, construing §
14(b) broadly would in fact create inherent tensions within the NLRA.153
Ignoring these fundamental differences between FIFRA and the
NLRA, the Sixth Circuit instead relies on the broad principles outlined in
Mortier.154 Viewing such principles as a broad pronouncement logically
supports the Sixth Circuit’s holding but fails to recognize the context in
which the Mortier Court applied those principles. The NLRA occupies a
fundamentally different position compared to FIFRA, and these key
distinctions support the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that Congress
impliedly intended to exclude political subdivisions from the scope of §
14(b).
2. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Serv., Inc.
In a similar fashion, the Seventh Circuit also correctly distinguished
Ours Garage based on the differences in statutory framework and overall
spirit of the two statutes in question. Ours Garage concerned the
Interstate Commerce Act and addressed an express preemption provision,
§ 14501(c)(2)(A), which saved “States” from preemption regarding safety
regulation of motor vehicles.155 The starting point for the Supreme
Court’s analysis was more in line with construction of § 14(b), as both
issues address a specific exception from preemption.156 While Ours
Garage did demonstrate that the Supreme Court would apply Mortier’s
principles to other statutory frameworks,157 the reasoning underlying
Ours Garage provides a clear basis for distinguishing the opinion.
151. See Mortier, 501 U.S. at 614.
152. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995, 1008 (7th
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019).
153. See supra Section III.B.
154. See United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. Local 3047 v. Hardin Cty.,
842 F.3d 407, 413-14 (6th Cir. 2016).
155. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 428 (2002); 49 U.S.C.
§ 14501(c)(2)(A).
156. Although the Seventh Circuit argues that § 14(b) plays a different role compared to §
14501(c)(2)(A), it is the Author’s position that both provisions are more similar than different. The
Seventh Circuit’s position appears to come from the NLRA’s broad and general preemption in the field
of labor relations, while the ICA has a narrower scope of preemption. See Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d
at 1008 (“Section 14(b) plays a different function; rather, it is an exception to the general preemption
established in the Act for the field of labor relations. The question is only how much subnational authority
does section 14(b) restore.”).
157. See United Auto., 842 F.3d at 414-15 (Ours Garage “closely followed the Mortier
analysis[.]”).
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As the Seventh Circuit correctly identified, Ours Garage depended
“heavily on an extensive contextual analysis” of other ICA provisions
“that have no corollary in the NLRA.”158 Whereas § 14(b) is the only
exception to preemption from the NLRA, the ICA contained a general
preemption provision followed by four statutory exceptions.159 The
general preemption provision embraces both “a State . . . [and a] political
subdivision of a State,”160 while the exception to preemption in §
14501(c)(2)(A) only references a “State.”161 Yet the third exception to
preemption also encompasses “a State or a political subdivision of a
State,”162 and this language is repeated in almost every other provision of
the section.163 Although this textual structure presented a closer call than
Mortier, the Ours Garage majority recognized that construing “State”
narrowly would create inherent tension within the ICA by precluding
localities from enforcing safety regulations of motor vehicles enacted by
the state legislature.164 As demonstrated in Section III(A), narrowly
construing the term “State” in § 14(b) would create no anomaly in
application of the NLRA; rather, broadly construing the term would
render other provisions superfluous.
Most importantly, Ours Garage demonstrates the fundamental
differences between statutes such as the ICA or FIFRA and the NLRA.
The Ours Garage majority continually references ICA’s focus on “safety
regulatory authority.”165 As the Court noted, “[t]his case . . . [deals] with
preemption stemming from Congress’ power to regulate commerce, in a
field where States have traditionally allowed localities to address local
concerns.”166 Expanding on this focus, the majority emphasized that Ohio
lawmakers had delegated some forms of motor vehicle regulations to the
cities.167 Moreover, the ICA primarily concerned economic regulation,
whereas § 14501(c)(2)(A) addressed traditional safety concerns.168 This
158. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1008.
159. City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 433 (2002).
160. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
161. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).
162. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(C).
163. Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 433.
164. Id. at 436 (Since § 14501(c)(1) preempts the power of both states and localities from enacting
or enforcing a law, “if . . . §14501(c)(2)(A) reaches only States, then localities are preempted not only
from enacting, but equally from enforcing, safety regulations[.]”)
165. Id. at 439.
166. Id. (“Congress’s clear purpose in § 14501(c)(2)(A) is to ensure that its preemption of States’
economic authority over motor carriers of property, . . . not restrict the preexisting and traditional state
police power over safety. That power typically includes the choice to delegate the State’s safety regulatory
authority to localities. Forcing a State to refrain from doing so would effectively restrict that very
authority.”) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 437-38.
168. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 399 v. Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d 995, 1008 (7th
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focus on safety regulations that had traditionally been reserved to the
states explains the fundamental difference between the NLRA and other
statutes such as FIFRA169 or the ICA.170 The NLRA stands in stark
contrast as it concerns labor relations, not safety regulations of the type
traditionally reserved for the states.171 Labor relations are a fundamentally
different concern, and the NLRA was enacted specifically to address
collective bargaining. Local right-to-work ordinances fly directly in the
face of the NLRA’s purpose. And although “states once used their police
powers to enact sweeping anti-labor laws, for nearly a century the
regulation of unions has rested with the federal, rather than state,
government.”172 These fundamental distinctions portray why even despite
the broad language in Mortier and Ours Garage, the focus should be on
the specific purpose and spirit of the statute at issue. And in this instance,
construing the term “State” in § 14(b) narrowly ensures that the NLRA
will continue to serve its intended purpose.
IV. CONCLUSION
Given the holdings of Mortier and Ours Garage, the Sixth Circuit was
correct to analyze § 14(b) within the framework of requiring clear and
manifest congressional intent to preempt local authority whenever a
statute delegates authority to a “State.” Yet as the preceding analysis
demonstrates, the Seventh Circuit correctly concluded that § 14(b) should
be narrowly construed such that political subdivisions are prohibited from
enacting local right-to-work ordinances. Taken as a whole, the NLRA’s
textual language, legislative history, and purpose demonstrate that the
statutory framework is indeed unique and provides the requisite
congressional intent to preempt political subdivisions. While Mortier and
Ours Garage might at first present compelling, analogous arguments for
permitting redelegation to political subdivisions under § 14(b), the
specific statutory frameworks of FIFRA and the ICA are more properly
distinguished from the NLRA. Although the Supreme Court has resolved
the circuit split given Illinois’ recent legislation, the foregoing argument
demonstrates that the proper interpretation of § 14(b) requires narrowly
construing “States” and prohibiting political subdivisions from regulating
Cir. 2018), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Vill. of Lincolnshire, Ill. v. Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs Local 399, 139 S. Ct. 2692 (2019).
169. See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 601 (1991) (“As amended, FIFRA specifies
several roles for state and local authorities.”).
170. This similarity can also explain why Ours Garage heavily borrowed from the principles
outlined in Mortier.
171. See Vill. of Lincolnshire, 905 F.3d at 1007 (“The federal labor laws, as we have already
explained, are a different matter altogether.”).
172. Id. at 1008.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

25

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 12

936

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

union-security agreements.
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